John E. McNaughton and Henrietta McNaughton v. John B. Eaton et al : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1955
John E. McNaughton and Henrietta McNaughton
v. John B. Eaton et al : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Colton & Hammond; Dean W. Sheffield; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, McNaughton v. Eaton, No. 8277 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2300
RECEIVE-D 
I 
l 
-~ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT~ · · 
OF ·THE. STATE OF UTAH 
' I I 
JOHN_ E. McNAUGHTON' and , 
HENRIETTA Mc~AUGHTON, 
hi~ wife, 
_··, , ... :· .. 
Appellants and Plaintiffs; 
- ,}~kJ~~~~-s:cC."' 
: vs:' '---,- ) I _ • ~r· ~ · · 
JOHN B. ·EATON; an UJ1-n1artied 
man; :tylY,RTLE ROSS;- JAMES H. 
FISHER ~nd cpNA-/ 'FISHER, ;.-
. husbaild and\vife; RICE COOPER . __ 
and EDITH , R. ~LAWRENCE 
-COOPER, husband and wiie;, W. 
S., ROSS;. and 'FERN. ROSS FA w:_ 
' . I 
CETT; JACK ~URNER -and 
MARIE TURNER, his wife, and 
. MYRONj PERR"X, - . -
,. ' / -
_/ , Responaents.and Defendants . I 
-' j} /; 
. -c:t 
l 
( 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
· Case~ No~ 
8277 -. 
. COLTON & HAMMOND _, 
- I-
. _. DEAN W.' SHEFFIELD --
1 ' . - . ' 
/ Attorneys for Respon.deflts . . 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ................................................................ 1 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................ 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ·············--···-----·-·····················----·····---··--··-··-·--- 4 
Point !-Appellants correctly assert that the pronounce-
ments of the Court on the original appeal are 
the law of the case ···--··-··-··-·--······--··-·-·················---······-· 5 
Point li-The Court properly limited plaintiffs' use of 
water to 2 C.F.S. upon a fixed time schedule .......... 7 
Point III-The trial Court fixed the irrigation s·eason at 
150 days at the instance of the appellants who 
cannot now be heard to attack the determination .. 10 
Point IV-The Trial Court properly restricted the plaintiffs 
from interfering with the balance of the waters 
of McNaughton Gulch .................................................. 14 
Point V-The evidence justifies the award of 3.5 acre feet 
of water ·-····--·······-·-·-···················-··············---···········-······-18 
Point VI-The decree in no way affects the McNaughton 
canal waters -·-·-··········-·······-···············----------············-······23 
Point VII-The Court properly determined the irrigated 
acreage to be 66.03 acres on the basis of the 
evidence available to him ----·······-···-···············-·---········23 
CONCLUSION ··················-································-··········--·-········--···········-····--25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TEXTS CITED 
Page 
Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States·, p. 522 ---------------------·-····-···-18 
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, p. 1591 --------·-··-·-------·····-·······18 
p. 1595 .................................. 19 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Dameron Valley Reservoir v. Bleak, 61 Utah 230, 211 P. 2d 974 ...... 16 
Jackson v. Spanish Fork- West Field Ir. Co., Utah 223 P. 2d 827 .... 18 
McNaughton v. Eaton, Utah 242, P. 2d 570 ...................................... 14, 17 
Mitchell v. Spanish Fork - West Field Irr. Co., 1 Utah 2d 313, 
265 p. 2d 1016 --------··-···················-················-···-·····-·-···----·······-·····-·······22 
Powerine Company v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 106 
Utah 348, 148 P. 2d 807 ········---·-----------············-········-····-·-····--·········-17 
Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 P. 273 .......................................... 19 
Stauffer v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 85 Utah 388, 39, P. 2d 725 ........ 16 
Wolfe v. White, 119 Utah 183, 225 P. 2d 729 ........................................ 14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOI-IN E. McNAUGHTON and 
HENRIETTA McNAUGHTON, 
his wife, 
Appellants and Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN B. EATON, an unmarried 
man; MYRTLE ROSS; JAMES H. 
FISHER and CUNA FISHER, 
husband and wife; RICE COOPER 
and EDITH R. LAWRENCE 
COOPER, husband and wife; W. 
S. ROSS; and FERN ROSS FAW-
CETT; JACK TURNER and 
MARIE TURNER, his wife, and 
MYRON PERRY, 
Respondents and Defendants 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8277 
This case was previously before the Supreme 
Court where the question of whether or not the wa-
ters here involved were public waters and subject 
1 
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2 
to appropriation and the rules applicable to such 
public waters was decided. The Supreme Court ruled 
that they were public waters, and remanded the case 
with directions. The present appeal by the plaintiffs 
stems from the further proceedings as directed by 
this court. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual picture so far as this case is con-
cerned is before the court in the form of the prior 
decision in the case together with the record therein, 
and in the form of a transcript of the proceedings 
upon the further hearing after the remand. Since 
the appeal raises questions concerning the sufficiency 
of evidence, these matters can best be considered from 
a factual standpoint in connection with the argu-
ments on such points. 
However, it might be appropriate at the outset 
to point out that this court in remanding the case 
pointed out very significantly what was expected of 
the trial court in the further proceedings. First it 
reaffirmed certain well-defined principles of water 
law as follows: (242 P. 2d 570 at p. 572) 
"Beneficial use is the basis, the measure 
and ihe limit of all right to the use of water 
in this state. Such has been the law both under 
and before we had a statute to that effect. No 
one can acquire the right to use more water 
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3 
than is necessary, vvith reasonable efficiency, 
to satisfy his beneficial requirements, even 
strangers have been allowed to make improve-
ments to water systems which would save wa-
ter and thereby acquire the right to bene-
ficially use the water saved. And water re-
duced to possession may not lawfully, in bad 
faith, be vvasted and thereby deprive others 
of its beneficial use." 
and concluded the decision as follows: 
" ... It is clear that all of these waters 
are subject to appropriation and the only right 
that can be acquired to their use is a reason-
ably efficient beneficial use, and defendants 
as subsequent appropriators are entitled to the 
use of all of such waters not necessary to sat-
isfy such requirements of plaintiffs." 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
Appellants corre~tly assert that the pronounce-
ments of the court on the original appeal are the law 
of the case. 
II 
The Court properly limited plaintiffs' use of 
water to 2 C.F.S. upon a fixed time schedule. 
III 
The trial court fixed the irrigation season at 150 
days at the instance of the appellant who cannot 
now be heard to attack the determination. 
IV 
The trial court properly restricted the plaintiffs 
from interfering with the balance of the waters of 
McNaughton Gulch. 
v 
The evidence justifies the award of 3.5 feet of 
water per acre. 
VI 
The decree in no way affects the McNaughton 
Canal waters. 
VII 
The court properly determined the irrigated 
acreage to be 66.03 acres on the basis of the evidence 
available to him. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Appellants correctly assert that the pronouncements 
of this Court on the original appeal are the law of the 
case. 
Respondents have no quarrel with Point I of 
Appellants' Brief insofar as it states the above en-
titled proposition. Respondents do however, feel that 
the Appellants lose sight of this proposition of law 
elsewhere in their brief, and particularly at Point IV, 
as will hereinafter be more particularly pointed out 
under Respondents' argument on that point. 
Respondents feel that the Trial Court had this 
principle well in mind in analyzing the extent to 
vvhich he was required to re-open the case under 
the Supreme Court's former decision. 
In his Memorandum Decision ( P. 2) the Trial 
Court reviewed the decision of the Supreme Court, 
and then said: 
"Restating the above so that it is more 
directly pointed to the present query, the court 
simply and directly states that the plaintiffs 
have the right to use all of the water of the 
McNaughton Gulch which, when used with 
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reasonable efficiency, is sufficient 'to satisfy 
the beneficial use of their (plaintiffs') appro-
priation.' " 
Elsewhere in his Memorandum Decision (P. 5) 
the court restates the problem as follows: 
''Thus under the mandate, we are to de-
termine how much of the gulch water is rea-
sonably necessary for plaintiff to use in a 
reasonably efficient manner in order to pro-
duce his crops upon 66.03 acres of land which 
must be watered by diversion from the gulch." 
and again, at P. 6: 
"Thus, the quantity of gulch water which 
the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest 
had diverted fr.om the gulch and applied to 
beneficial use prior to 1903, is the amount of 
water that he now has the right to divert and 
use. It is our problem to find o~t what that 
was." 
The case then so far as the further proceedings 
were concerned, was addressed to the inquiry, "What 
water rights do the plaintiffs have based upon bene-
ficial use thereof as fixed prior to 1903? And with 
the recognition of the rights of the defendants to 
any waters in excess of those rights as indicated by 
the quote from the Supreme Court's original opinion 
as set out heretofore in Respondents' Additional State-
ment of Facts, P. 2. 
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POINT II 
The Court properly limited plaintiffs' use of water 
to 2 C.F.S. upon a fixed time schedule. 
Appellants assertion of error stemming from the 
2 C.F.S. award which the court made for a fixed pe-
riod of 92 hours and 24 minutes each 1 0-day period 
appears to be predicated upon the theory that because 
the flovv was not constant that plaintiffs should not 
be boun.d by any limitation. This does violence to 
the evidence upon which the trial court found the 
facts, both at the original trial and at the retrial. 
The impression apparently sought to be created 
in appellants' brief, by the undue emphasis upon the 
findings of the trial court as to variation from day 
to day and season to season, and from a flow of sev-
eral cubic feet to a low ebb when the flow is negli-
gible, is that a great deal of the time the flow is 
negligible. Let us therefore, analyze the evidence 
to allay such a misconception. 
On the 23rd day of February, 1954, four months 
after all irrigation had ceased on surrounding lands, 
their own witness, David Gardner, found 11h second 
feet of v\·ater in the Gt1lch at Dam No. 3, plaintiff's 
only dam on his own premises (Retrial R. 30-31). 
Ed Tyzach, for plaintiffs, testified of visiting the 
Gulch to fish, svvim or catch muskrats sometime near 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
but after 1900 ( R. 22) . Asher Merkley for plaintiffs 
stated that he had never seen the Gulch dry and that 
for the past 40 years there has always been from 
three to seven cubic feet second flow into Ashley 
Central Canal from McNau·ghton Gulch (R. 63-64). 
He. continued to say that he knew the only water 
defendants had to irrigate their lands came from 
MeN a ugh ton Gulch and that they had always raised 
a crop (R. 66-67-68). Ed Hoeft had never seen the 
Gulch dry and always irrigated 30 acres himself 
from the Gulch (R. 108). Ernest Johnson later owned 
the H~eft place and always had plenty of water to 
irrigate 30 acres and never had to go up stream (R. 
121, 125). McNaughton can only remember one year 
when water did not run through his east fence (R. 
202) and during water time he turns water out on 
pasture and then it drains and goes back down the 
Gulch ( R. 206-207) . L. P. Christensen found 1 ~ 
cubic feet second being diverted to North from vicin-
ity of lower McNaughton Dam and~ cubic feet sec-
ond to the South during time of first trial in July 
and forepart of August, 1950. (R. 244, 253). On Au-
gust 1st, 1950, James Fisher estimated 2 feet in diver-
sion to the North of McNaughton No. 3 (R. 282). 
W. Simpson Ross remembers only one year that wa-
ter did not flow in Gulcl1 (R. 322). It is admitted by 
all that until 1948 all parties had and used water 
from McNaughton Gulch and apparently had suf-
ficient to mature their crops without incident. 
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The record ther1, definitely established that 
there is always a considerable flow in McNaughton 
Gulch. That it flows year round. That its constant 
flow varies fro1n season to season only as other 
streams may vary because of wet years or extreme 
drougl1t conditions. That irrigation practices effect 
the flow only by adding to the already constant flow 
of the Gulch. The trial court, after considering all 
evidence, deter1nined that the variations of the Gulch 
\vere not of such a nature which would prevent Mc-
Naughton from obtaining the irrigation head neces-
sary to properly irrigate his land if he followed the 
irrigation practices he had used in the past by taking 
all water of the Gulch not to exceed 2 cubic feet sec-
ond and addi11g it to his canal water for a period of 
92 hours 24 minutes each ten days. McNaughton's 
own testimony substantiates this determination. Mc-
Naughton stated he needed a stream of 1 to 1 ;6 feet 
to get over his ground CR. 157) which he repeated 
as being the desired flow and volumn to cover his 
land CR. 200). He added that if the Gulch didn't flow 
that much he supplemented it with canal water CR. 
1-JS, 157) but that some summers it wasn't necessary 
to use canal water at all. 
McNaughton testified that the 12;6 shares of 
stock he owned in Ashley Upper Canal Co. was the 
same stock his predecessors had used and that the 
McNaughton land involved in this suit is irrigated 
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by water from the Ashley Upper Canal Company. (R. 
209, 210, 211, 212). He also stated that he now leases 
his canal stock and also practically all of his 125 
shares in Ashley Valley reservoir; that 1 share of 
Upper Ashley Canal stock is allowed to each 10 
acres of land (R. 154, .155). 
The trial court very painstakingly reviewed the 
evidence in his Memorandum Decision on this ques-
tion of the flow of waters in the Gulch, and has in 
that Memorandum Decision preserved his analysis 
for review by the Supreme Court. We call the Court's 
attention particularly to pages 8 through 16. 
It should also be noted that the court granted 
the plaintiff .5 acre feet more water per acre than 
he felt the evidence otherwise justified on the basis 
of existing variables. (See Memorandum Decision 
(P. 15). 
POINT Ill 
The Trial Court fixed the irrigation season at 150 
days at the instance of the appellants, who cannot now 
be heard to attack that determination. 
The court in its Memorandum Decision adopted 
a growing season of 180 days. There was considerable 
evidence at the retrial of this matter concerning this 
precise point, and for convenience of the court we 
herewith abstract the same: 
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David I. Gardner, an engineer called by Mc-
Naughton testified that growing season for grain was 
90 to 100 days and for alfalfa 180 days (Retrial R. 8, 
53) but stated his testimony was based on experience 
in other parts of the state, not Ashley Valley. (Retria~ 
R. 71, 44). After qualifying as an expert he expressed 
his opinion that McNaughton land would require six 
acre feet of water per year to mature crops (Retrial 
R. 20, 7 5). He freely admitted however that he had 
never made an experiment in Ashley Valley (Re-
trial 44, 71); that he had only been through Vernal 
3 times (Retrial 76); and had only visited the Mc-
Naughton property once and that was for approxi-
mately one hour just preceeding the trial during 
vvhich he had vYalked up and down the Gulch and 
viewed the premises from an automobile along the 
highway (Retrial27, 35, 36). 
In contrast, L. P. Christensen, testified that he 
was a Civil Engineer with 34 years experience in 
Ashley Valley and in charge of distribution of waters 
in Ashley Valley since 1920. (Retrial 88). Mr. Chris-
tensen stated that 3 acre feet per acre per year would 
adequately irrigate the McNaughton land (Retrial93, 
95). Mr. Christensen, after taking into consideration 
water table and type of soil, pointed out that one 
share of water in Ashley Upper was allotted to each 
10 acres and that it would produce on the average 
) acre feet per acre per year. (Retrial 92). One share 
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of Ashley Valley .2 acre feet per acre per year (Re-
trial 93). Mr. Christensen repeated that John Mc-
Naughton owned 12.5 shares of Ashley Upper and 
125 shares Reservoir (R. 254, 255, Retrial R. 89). On 
the first hearing Mr. Christensen testified that 1 share 
to 10 acres in Ashley Upper and 1 share to each acre 
in Ashley Reservoir would in normal years provide 
a full water right for land in Ashley Valley ( R. 260), 
McNaughtons ovvn only 80 acres of land. 
The trial court noted the discrepancy in the 
testimony of the experts. Which one is in a better 
position to know? vVhich one is experienced in Ash-
ley Valley? What is the situation on other lands in 
the Valley? The court granted plaintiffs 3.5 acre feet 
per acre per year and the growing season of 180 days. 
The maximum requested. (Memorandum decision 
page 15-16). Then upon plaintiffs own Motion for 
Further Consideration and Memorandum in Support 
thereof, plaintiffs testimony to the contrary, the 
court shortened the irrigation season to 150 days 
(Court order correcting Memorandum Decision) . In 
the face of this record it is difficult to find reason in 
plaintiffs now charging error with reference. to the 
irrigation season limitation fixed and shortened at 
their own request. 
The court's limitation is only upon the plaintiffs 
use of Gulch water and is based upon that diverted 
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and beneficially applied prior to 1903. They have 
historically had and used the above mentioned canal 
water upon their lands. The court has determined 
what use plaintiff made of Gulch water prior to 1903 
and awarded that to them. The plaintiff can take 
that much vvater from the Gulch whether or not there 
remains sufficient water for defendants even though 
they also have historically had sufficient water from 
the Gulch to irrigate their lands. 
The Appellants having importuned the trial 
cotlrt to shorten the season to 150 days, which matter 
was acceded to by the Respondents and the Trial 
Court, it would seemingly come with ill grace for 
the Appellants to predicate error thereon. If their 
clisagreen1ent is both with the length of irrigation 
season, and with the duty of water, certainly it would 
seem that they must stand their ground in both re-
spects if they are to be heard on appeal on both 
matters, rather than affirmatively suggest a shorter 
season be entered in the findings.· 
The Court was amply justified in its findings in 
regard to this point, and what the Court did in effect 
was to limit one of the rights of the appellants (plain-
tiffs) at their own request. In this respect, the Trial 
Court was merely doing what this court has on oc-
casion done, that is, comply with the request of a 
party where his rights may be greater, but where for 
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special reasons he does not desire to have them as-
serted fully. Wolfe v. White, Utah, 225 P. 2d 729. 
What the appellants really seek to do under this 
point, however, it appears, is to attack indirectly the 
finding of the trial court that 3.5 acre feet is the 
reasonable duty of water in the present instance. The 
anamoly, if existant, is one created by the appellants, 
and not one of the court's making. The evidence on 
the question of duty of water is treated by Respon-
dents elsewhere in this brief, and clearly prepon-
derates in favor of the trial court's ruling. 
POINT IV 
The Trial Court properly restricted the plaintiffs from 
interfering with the balance of the waters of McNaughton 
Gulch. 
Appellants are most unrealistic in their claim 
under point IV of their brief that error exists by rea-
son of the restrictions which the court placed upon 
them. 
The matter of the existence of a right to form 
the basis for the restrictions appears to be fully and 
completely disposed of by the factual picture as it 
developed in this case, and by the opinion of the 
Supreme Court on the previous appeal. 242 P 2d 570. 
The present lawsuit was precipitated by the 
assertion of the defendants of their rights in the Me-
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Naughton Gulch waters. The plaintiffs as upper 
stream users are in a position to interfere with the 
defendants use, and by their actions prior to suit 
and by bringing suit, they have manifest every in-
tention and desire to completely nullify the rights 
of lower stream users. 1,his has been the exact nature 
of their approach to the problem. Obviously then, 
if the plaintiffs as upper users do not willingly com-
ply with the judgment of the court, the situation is 
one which is fraught with possibility of serious con-
sequences. 
It rather begs the question to say that the court 
cannot be realistic in its approach to a problem so 
serious and real as is this one. The history of the 
West is filled with instances of physical violence 
engendered by disagreements over water rights and 
water turns. Certainly the court is not required to 
close its eyes to just such a problem after having de-
termined that the plaintiff is not entitled to stop all 
lower users from obtaining water as he began doing 
in 1948, and as he seeks to do permanently. 
Appellants, since they have no rights in the wa-
ters in excess of the beneficial use as fixed by the 
Court are not adversely affected by the restraints 
imposed upon them, unless they contemplate viola-
tion of the decree and continued use of the excess 
waters. 
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The appellants cite numerous cases establishing 
the proposition that the court could not properly im-
pose restraints on behalf of the defendants because 
it was not established that they had rights. In the 
case of Dameron Valley Reservoir v. Bleak, 61 Utah 
230, 211 P. 974, the facts make the case completely 
distinguishable. The case commenced by the plaintiff 
seeking an injunction was unsuccessful when he 
failed to establish prior righ~s to those of the de-
fendant. 
In the case of Stauffer v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 
85 Utah 388, 39 P. 2d 725, the plaintiff sought an in-
junction based upon rights which he unsuccessfully 
asserted, because he failed to establish that defend-
ants were using waters in excess of their entitle-
ment. Having failed to establish the rights upon 
which the injunction was asserted, the rule followed 
that plaintiff could not obtain the injunction for 
interference with those rights. 
In the principle case the plaintiff commenced 
the suit and asserted rights against the defendant 
which they have been partially unsuccessful in main-
taining in that they have not been able to establish· 
unqualified right to the waters of McNaughton 
Gulch. The assertion of the right to all of the waters 
howeyer makes it clear that their claim does interfere 
with the rights of the defendant. The suit as com-
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me11ced by the plaintiff was not intended as an ad-
judication of the specific rights of the various de-
fendants, but was the assertion of the rights of the 
plaintiffs in derrogation of the rights of the defend-
ants in general. 
rfo raise the contention that defendants estab-
lished no rights to water from the Gulch is highly 
unrealistic. It flies in the face of the evidence at the 
trial initially and the retrial, and furthermore, over-
looks one of the basic premises upon which the plain-
tiffs predicate their appeal. That is, that the first 
decision of the Supreme Court has become the law 
of the case. In that opinion the court said: (242 P. 
2d -570) 
" ... defendants as subsequer1t appropri-
ators are entitled to the use of all of such wa-
ters not necessary to satisfy such requirements 
of the plaintiffs." 
It is not necessary for the rights of the defend-
ants as against each other to be fully adjudicated in 
this proceedings in order that the plaintiffs be re-
strained from interfering with those rights. It is 
sufficient that as betweer1 the plaintiffs and the de-
fendants generally it be established that the rights 
do exist. The remand to the District Court establishes 
this fact, and forecloses the plaintiffs on this point. 
Powerine Company v. Zions Savings Bank & Trust 
Co., 106 Utah 384, 148 P. 2d 807. 
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The question of the extent and nature of the 
rights as between the various defendants was never 
litigated in this suit, although there is a finding as 
to a previous decree as between some of the defend-
ants, and based upon the introduction thereof in 
evidence. CR. 300-301) 
POINT V 
The evidence iustifies the award of 3.5 acre feet 
of water. 
The principles upon which the duty of water is 
to be determined are clear, and sufficienly well estab-
lished as to make a discussion of them herein perhaps 
more academic than helpful from a practical stand-
point. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, 
quoted by Appellants commencing at page 522; Kin-
ney on Irrigation and Water Rights, page 1591, quoted 
by appellants, set forth basic principles with which 
the Utah Courts have come into contact at various 
times. 
As a result of application of fundamental prin-
ciples to particular factual situations, this court has 
approved a wide variety of water duty ratios. Per-
haps one of the highest is to be found in the case 
of. Jackson v. Spanish Fork & West Field Irrigation 
Co. Utah, 223 P. 2d 827. The rule, however, which 
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that case and each water case involving duty of water 
teaches, is that every case must necessarily be based 
upon its own facts, and that the trial court must 
conclude from the best evidence it has before it what 
a proper duty is for the particular case. For this rea-
son, other cases are of help only in determining prin-
ciples generally. Such a case is that of Sharp v. Whit-
more, 51 Utah 14, 168 P. 273 relied upon heavily by 
the appellants. As stated by Kinney on Irrigation and 
\Vater rights, p. 1595, in summarizing his prior dis-
cussion: 
·'From the above it can readily be seen that 
no hard fast rule can be made as to the duty 
of \Vater which will apply to all cases. There-
fore, the proper duty of water can only be 
determined from all the facts surrounding 
each particular case." 
The very best evidence upon which a court can 
base its determination is not a forced parallel be-
tween the case at bar and another decided case, but 
upon an analysis of the evidence in the particular 
case. 
Using this approach, let us review the evidence 
upon which the court based its decision of 3.5 acre 
feet in the present case, and particularly the evidence 
of the experts therein involved. 
Two experts testified concerning the duty of 
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water. Gardner for the plaintiff testified that in his 
opinion six acre feet was necessary (Retrial 20). 
The basis of his opinion appeared to be two fold: One 
the assertion that the entire area was sandy loam 
(Retrial 15-16) which statement he could not sus-
tain and later qualified (Retrial 66) on cross exami-
nation; and an assertion that this high duty was be-
cause of the topography of the tract, that is, it was 
uneven with a number of swales and high spots. (Re-
trial 16). He conceded, however, that the applica-
tion of si_x acre feet would result in a large flow of 
waste water. CRetrial22). Mr. Gardner was not a resi-
dent of the area, and had made no tests of any kind 
in the a~ea, and in fact was almost completely unfa-
miliar with the area except for having gone over a 
portion of the ground on the day in question. 
On the other hand, Leon P. Christenson, a civil 
engineer who is also Secretary for the Ashley Upper 
Canal Co., and who had 34 years of experience in 
the Ashley Valley area including experience as a 
farmer, testified that he was familiar with the soil 
on the McNaughton place, that it was not excessively 
sandy, and that if handled properly three acre feet 
would be a proper duty of water (Retrial 93). He 
also indicated that the McNaughton land had suf-
fered in the past in certain parts because of over 
application of water (Retrial 98, 100). He also was 
able to state from experience and first hand knowl-
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edge that the duty of water as figured under the 
Ashley Upper Canal Co. was on the basis of 3 acre 
feet per acre. 
Here then was a witness with the benefit both 
of qualification as a civil engineer, and experience 
of 34 years in that capacity and as a fanner, and a 
person with a direct working knowledge of the land 
involved, "\tvho was able to state with certainty what 
the duty of water should be in the area, based upon 
the soil, the area and first hand knowledge of all of 
the factors. Christenson also indicated that the Mc-
Naughton ground was only average in the area as 
to unevenness (Retrial 100, 101), and that this did 
not require that a higher duty of water be imposed, 
but rather that a different application be made. (Re-
trial 101). 
J. Ferron Hacking, a farmer, in Ashley Valley 
irrigates corn and other grains 3 times a season, pas-
ture every 2 weeks, (Retrial R. 111, 114, 116) and 
states that every 10 days is too often for alfalfa. (Re-
trial 115) . Hacking adds that his land requires more 
V\rater than McNaughton's. (Retrial 114). 
Jack C. Turner who adjoins McNaughton on the 
East, testified that in a year drier than usual he ap-
plied water every two weeks, and irrigated corn twice 
during the entire year (Retrial 103-104). 
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vVith reference to type of soil the witnesses had 
this to say. J. Ferron Hacking said that McNaughton 
soil was of a clay nature (Retrial 114). Jack C. Tur-
ner identified it as being similar to his, a heavy soil 
-a clay C;Retrial 106 and Defendants exhibits 1A 
and 2A received in evidence Retrial 120). Franklin 
Lewis, a Vernal resident, classified the soil as a heavy 
clay with sandy loam back further (Retrial 86). 
At Point III Respondents have heretofore set out 
in detail additional evidence with respect to the 3.5 
acre feet duty of water. 
It appears that the issue here becomes essentially 
one as to whether or not the evidence is competent 
and adequate to sustain the Court in its determination 
with respect to the duty of water, and it is respectfully 
submitted, that the evidence amply sustains the trial 
court, and that in fact, a finding based upon witness 
Gardner's testimony relative to six acre feet could 
not be sustained under the evidence. 
As pointed out by this court in the case of Mitch-
ell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. (Utah 
2d 313, 265 P. 2d 1016: 
" ... it must be kept in mind that the quan-
tity of water acquired is limited to that which 
is beneficially used upon the land. The evi-
dence was in direct conflict, yet there is ade-
quate support therein for the conclusion that 
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21/2 c.f.s. for 12 hours once a week is all the 
water that was put to a beneficial use upon 
the land upon which the use was established." 
POINT VI 
The Decree in no way affects the 
McNaughton Canal Waters 
The assertion of the appellants at Point VI of 
their brief appears to pretty well answer itself. The 
respondents at no time asserted ownership rights in 
plaintiffs' canal water. Those waters were not in-
volved in the suit between the parties except as they 
came in incidentally thereto, and of course, the de-
fendants cannot in any way prevent the plaintiffs 
from using their canal water as they see fit. This 
is a matter between the plaintiffs and the canal com-
pany. 
The trial court properly limited the findings, 
conclusions and decree to the issues involved between 
the parties. 
POINT VII 
The Court properly determined the Irrigated Acreage 
to be 66.03 acres on the· basis of the evidence available 
to him. 
Appellants apparently concede that there is an 
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area of approximately seven acres lying within the 
Gulch. There is no evidence that it was irrigated 
other than by return seepage waters from the upper 
lands. Tl1is seepage, of course, continues, and will 
continue. Plaintiffs certainly offered no help to the 
court in presenting the question of use of water on 
this seven-acre tract. The contention can scarcely 
" be made now that tl~ey are entitled to irrigate this 
strip when they have never done so before. The court 
went upon the premises and viewed them, and cer-
tainly was in a position thereafter to determine 
whether or not additional waters should be awarded 
coveri1~g that property. Since the run-off must neces-
sarily traverse this area, it does not appear that ap-
pellants were entitled to more than the 66.03 acres 
which the court determined vvere being irrigat~d. 
Nor is the issue precluded under the doctrine 
of the law of the case as plaintiffs assert. This, for 
the reason that the court sent the case back specif-
ically to have the trial court determine how much 
water was necessary to satisfy the requirements of 
the plaintiffs. (See last sentence of opinion as here-
tofore quoted at p. 17, of this brief.) 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, that the trial court 
in the present instance adjusted the matter well 
within the framework of the evidence produced, and 
achieved a result which will stand the test of a re-
view of the evidence. In the rehearing of the matter, 
he stayed within the issues which the Supreme Court 
returned to him for determination. 
This is a matter which is made doubly difficult 
by the fact that the parties were able to administer 
their various rights on the stream without need of 
interference by the court until 1948, and the lower 
users vvere able to irrigate without interference from 
the upper user, but having resolved itself into a law-
suit, the situation was one fraught with considerable 
possibility of additional strife, both legal and physical. 
Therefore, the court, treating the matter realistically, 
............ , saw the solution to be the insertion of restric-
tions which would have the effect of eliminating this 
source of friction so far as the parties are concerned. 
In this he made a wise decision, and one certainly 
well within the bounds of his discretion. 
We feel that the court was more liberal in grant-
ing the appellants 3.5 acre feet of water per acre than 
he might have been, but recognize also that he was 
considering the> matter from all aspects and from the 
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usual and the unusual situations which might be en-
countered. Accqrdingly, we respectfully submit that 
his determination on this score can and will stand 
the test of rigid scrutiny. 
It is submitted that the trial court pursuant to 
the mandate of this court reviewed the question of 
beneficial use of water on the lands in question to 
determine the proper award to the plaintiffs within 
the framework of the law, that he, with great care 
and competence, reviewed the factual picture and 
weighed the evidence in arriving at his decision, and 
that the decision thus rendered is accurate and just. 
The trial court has given the court the benefit 
of a Memorandum Decision in the case which illus-
trates his analysis and sound reasoning. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision 
herein should be affirmed. 
COLTON & HAMMOND 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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